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The issues of tax evasion and tax avoidance have gained more attention in the political and 
economic debates since the revelations from Panama Papers and Paradise Papers. Since then, the 
OECD has extensively pushed to increase the country memberships in the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) initiative beyond the OECD borders. 1  As a result, many Eastern European 
countries have started to implement the first stages of the BEPS action plan. However, weaker 
institutions are likely to be a large obstacle in the expansion of the BEPS initiative beyond the 
OECD borders. Different international organizations have repeatedly stated that corruption in tax 
administration2 and the practice of revolving tax officials3 are serious threats to the ability of 
countries to enforce the collection of tax liabilities of multinational firms. Coupled with evidence 
that even large multinational companies are involved in straightforward corruption practices4, this 
raises a question of whether corruption in the tax administration may affect profit shifting decisions 
on multinational companies.  
In this paper, we build a theoretical model in which a large multinational firm weights the costs of 
shifting profits against the benefits. The benefits include low tax rates. In the costs function, we 
introduce corruption in the tax administration. In our model governments have regulations to help 
them fight tax avoidance, i.e. to monitor the legal transfer of profits between countries. A firm that 
is involved in profit shifting devotes some time to comply with the country level regulations. In 
our model, these efforts are threatened by the possibility that firms may encounter corrupt tax 
officials. These officials can help them bypass the regulations or speed up the process in exchange 
for favors, such as, for instance, a position in the accounting division of the involved firm. This 
low-level corruption is virtually undetectable, hard to sanction and as result can be found even in 
the tax administration in highly developed countries. 5  Our model predicts that this type of 
 
1 https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf 
2 See for example the joint report of IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank mandated at the G-20 Seoul for the G20 Summit 
(https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/seoul/48993634.pdf) 
3 See for example the United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Illicit financial flows: report of the 
High-Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa. Addis Ababa, page 35. 
4 The case of Glencore, which is a US-Swiss company, that has been involved in corruption activities in Congo is being 
investigated by the US Department of Justice. For details see: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-
03/glencore-gets-subpoena-from-u-s-regarding-money-laundering 
5  For instance, World Bank Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/corruption) 
report that the average percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request is 3.5%, while the average 
percent of firms expecting informal payment to public officials is 10.7% among the OECD countries. This implies a 
high level of informal bribery among the OECD countries. In contrast, for instance in Ukraine, these numbers are 
50.4% and 73.1% and in Romania 9.8% and 18.7% respectively.  
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corruption amplifies profit shifting of multinational firms. We find that the size of the effect of 
corruption on profit shifting depends on the amount of tax that can be saved shifting a unit of profit.  
We test the predictions of the theoretical model by deriving a corruption adjusted tax differential 
(CTC). The model implies that companies with higher CTC should report lower profits in a given 
country. Using a panel of firm-level data on European companies, we show that multinationals 
report lower profits in affiliates that face higher levels of the CTC parameter. Using interaction 
effects model, we find that this effect is driven by both corruption and tax rate differences. The 
higher the corruption level in a given country, the larger is the effect of the tax rate differential on 
reported profits. Hence, our empirical results confirm that a) corruption amplifies profit shifting 
and b) that this effect increases in the tax rate differences that define the savings obtained by 
shifting a unit of profit.  
Further, we use our findings to estimate tax revenue elasticities for European countries and find 
that accounting for corruption creates a much higher variation in the tax revenue elasticities then 
previous studies have indicated. Our empirical results imply that the more corrupt the country is, 
the larger the effect the tax rate differential will have on the firm’s reported profits in this country. 
For example, in Italy an increase in the statutory tax rate by 1% creates approximately 7% - 12% 
less tax revenue gain than in Norway. Without accounting for corruption, both countries would 
have almost the same tax revenue elasticity, since the statutory tax rate is 27.5% in Italy and 28% 
in Norway. 
Our findings are novel to the literature on profit shifting and corruption, where most of the 
contributions analyze either the effects of taxes or the effects of corruption on firms’ profits. In this 
paper we combine both strands of the literature to show how the effects of taxes on shifted profits 
are affected by the extent of corruption. Most of the theoretical contributions in the corporate tax 
literature use models where a profit-shifting firm has to weight the risk and the cost of hiding profits 
against the gains from the reduced tax burden (see for example Dischinger and Riedel (2011), 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) or Davies et.al. (2018)). The general agreement is that firms shift 
profits to affiliates in countries with lower corporate tax rates (Hines and Rice (1994), Desai et al. 
(2006)), especially to those located in tax havens (Gumpert et al. (2016), Dowd et al. (2017)). Firms 
use a variety of strategies to avoid paying corporate taxes, such as debt shifting (Desai et al. (2004), 
Huizinga el at. (2008)), transfer pricing (Cristea and Nguyen (2016), Davies et al. (2018)) and 
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intellectual property location (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011). In their metastudy, Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2017) calculate the response of profits to tax rate differentials to find a tax semi‐elasticity 
of subsidiary pre‐tax profits of about 0.8. The average magnitude of the estimates we present in 
this paper is in line with those semi-elasticities. However, we show that adding corruption generates 
a large heterogeneity in those semi-elasticities across countries. 
The determinants of the costs of profit shifting are understudied in the literature. Bilicka and Fuest 
(2014) study information exchange between tax authorities and Johannesen et al. (2017) consider 
the effect of government quality on profit shifting. We present evidence that corruption may be 
another determinant of costs of profit shifting. More recently, Bilicka (2019), Torslov et al. (2018) 
and Jansky and Palansky (2019) measure the extent of profit shifting and show it is large. This 
suggests that the extent to which corruption can affect revenue elasticities may be large too. 
In the corruption literature, until recently, collusion of tax payers and corrupt tax officials has only 
received the attention in theoretical models focusing on the interaction between income tax evasion 
and corruption (Chander & Wilde, 1992; Besley & McLaren, 1993; Flatters & Macleod, 1995; 
Mookherjee & Png, 1995; Hindriks, Keen, & Muthoo, 1999; Marjit, Seidel, & Thum, 2017). There 
are very few studies that examine the interaction of business tax evasion and corruption (Chen & 
Chu, 2005; Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Seidel & Thum, 2016). Recent empirical studies show that 
small and medium size firms do not necessarily suffer from corruption, as they benefit from tax 
evasion opportunities resulting from collusion with tax officials (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, & 
McClellan, 2016; Gauthier & Goyette, 2014; Jagger & Shively, 2015; Khan, Khwaja, & Olken, 
2016). Recently, corruption has received more attention in relation to profit shifting. Notably, 
Hebous and Lipatov (2014) consider the effects of corruption on the amount of investment 
concealed in tax havens. Our results show that, more generally, corruption affects the amounts of 
profits shifted by multinationals between countries, not necessarily just to tax havens. 
2. A SIMPLE THEORY OF PROFIT SHIFTING AND CORRUPTION 
2.1. THE COSTS OF PROFIT SHIFTING IN THE PRESENCE OF CORRUPTION  
A multinational group operates establishments in 𝑛𝑛 countries. 6  Let us assume that the profit 
generated by an affiliate of the multinational in country 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,𝑛𝑛] is 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖. The profit generated in 
 
6  Here, we assume that the allocation of profits across countries is given, along with the location choice of 
multinationals. In the Online Appendix B.3. we relax this assumption and show that our baseline results hold.  
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country 𝑖𝑖 is taxed at the rate 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. The multinational can shift the amount 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 of profits in and out of 
country 𝑖𝑖. When 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 > 0 the multinational shifts profits generated in country 𝑖𝑖 out and when 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 < 0 
it shifts profits generated somewhere else in. There exists a probability of being audited by a 
domestic tax official. These probabilities differ by countries depending on their regulatory 
environments and tax codes7; e.g. one in 100 firms gets audited by Internal Revenue Services each 
year in the United States8 Firms are audited after they submit their tax statement. The tax official 
has to evaluate whether the tax statement is in line with the tax responsibility of the firm defined 
by the domestic tax law and international transfer pricing agreements. During the auditing process, 
firms have to cooperate with the tax official and dedicate a substantial amount of time and effort 
to defend their tax statement. These auditing costs increase considerably when firms shift profits, 
for example because of increasingly complicated accounting rules and numerous debates on the 
interpretation of the tax law.  
Following Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008), we assume that the positive 
costs of a tax audit induced by profit shifting are 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖2 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖⁄ , with 𝛾𝛾>0 being a cost parameter. We 
therefore follow the assumption that “the marginal cost of shifting profits rises in proportion to the 
ratio of shifted profits to true profits” (Huizinga and Laeven (2008)). Hence, we assume that to 
accommodate profit shifting 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 company's accounts have to be distorted relatively little, if true 
profits 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 are relatively large. For simplicity, let us assume that a firm that does not shift profits 
does not face any auditing costs. Hence, auditing costs are always exclusively the result of profit 
shifting.  
The tax official who audits a firm can be honest or corrupt. Let us assume that the corrupt tax 
official will never assist in tax evasion, as the risk of severe punishment is very high.9 However, 
he can offer to minimize the auditing cost in exchange for a bribe 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖.10 Encountering a corrupt tax 




9 This assumption is relevant in low and middle-income European countries that we will consider in our empirical 
analysis. The punishment for assisting in tax evasion in those countries is high and the detection risk is also high, 
especially when multinational companies are involved. Note, that this may not hold in less developed countries. 
10 Corrupt tax officials could, despite the legality of tax avoidance, harass firms by threatening them to increase auditing 
costs in the case of non-cooperation. In the case of tax evasion Marjit, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee (2000) have shown 
that harassment does not influence the level of tax evasion. Harassment only allows corrupt tax official to extract more 
bribes from firms. Firms still profit from corruption in the tax administration. The same is true, if we allow for 
harassment in the case of tax avoidance. However, for simplicity of notation we abstain from this effect in our analysis. 
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(e.g. concert tickets) or offering prospective employment in firms that are being audited. Despite 
extensive regulations, those practices are still prevalent in many highly developed European 
countries, such as Greece or Italy.11 Let us assume, for simplicity, that a corrupt tax official can 
decrease the auditing costs to zero. Therefore, when a firm meets a corrupt tax official the auditing 
costs can be zero, when the firm and the tax official come to an agreement. In contrast, when a firm 
that shifts profits encounters an honest tax official, it always faces the full auditing costs. Let us 
further assume, that tax officials face no tax auditing costs themselves and that there is no risk of 
detection and therefore punishment when making a deal with a corrupt official on both sides. 12 
We start the analysis with deriving the cost of profit shifting in the presence of corruption in the 
tax administration.13 We can write the payoffs (𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) of a multinational affiliate that does not come 
to an agreement with a corrupt tax official or encounters an honest tax official as14 
[1] 




We can write the payoffs (𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁) of an affiliate that comes to an agreement with a corrupt tax official 
as 
[1]  𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁 = [𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖] ∙ [1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖] − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖. [2] 
The negotiation between the corrupt tax official and the firm takes place in the form of Nash 
bargaining, with symmetric bargaining power. 15 The firm and the corrupt tax official jointly 
maximize the benefits occurring from cooperation, which are defined as the differences between 
their utility from cooperation and non-cooperation. The joint optimization problem of a firm and a 
corrupt tax official is therefore: 
 
11  See for instance recent article from Financial Times (https://www.ft.com/content/9cd87756-269d-11e8-b27e-
cc62a39d57a0). 
12 This is a strong assumption. Introducing the risk of punishment would increase the amount of bribery. Depending 
on how the punishment is shared among the culprits the rent allocation would change and, in some cases, both parties 
would not reach an agreement. However, none of these affect the comparative statistics of the model as long as we do 
not assume non-liner punishment schemes.   
13 In the Online Appendix B.1 we consider how corruption outside of the tax administration affects the generation of 
profits in the first place. 
14 As in the previous literature (see for example Huizinga and Laeven (2008)), we assume that profit shifting costs as 
well as bribery costs are not tax deductible. This assumption helps to reduce the calculus substantially and does not 
change the main implications of the model. 
15 The main result of the model does not depend on the assumption of the specific form of bargaining or the distribution 
of the bargaining power. This is the case because for the bargaining to be successful the bribe always has to be smaller 
than the bureaucracy cost. 
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The level of bribe increases in the size of auditing costs. From [1], [2] and [4] it follows that there 
is always a level of bribe a firm and the corrupt tax official can agree on, because 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑆𝑆) <
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁(𝑆𝑆,𝐵𝐵∗). Hence, when a firm meets a corrupt tax official, it will always pay a bribe. With 
probability 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, a firm meets an honest official and with probability 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 a corrupt tax official. 
Therefore, we will refer to 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 as control of corruption. The expected costs of profit shifting are 
[1] 1
2




From this, we can derive that with increasing control of corruption in the tax administration ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖), 
the cost of profit shifting increases. 
2.2. PROFIT SHIFTING AND CORRUPTION IN THE TAX ADMINISTRATION 
Taking the cost of profit shifting in the presence of corruption as given, the multinational has to 
decide how to allocate profits between affiliates, i.e. how much profits to shift in and out of each 
affiliate. From the previous assumptions and [5] we can derive the worldwide after-tax profits of a 
multinational. 
[1] 
Π = �[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖] ∙ [1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖] −
1
2






The multinational chooses the profit shifted 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 to or from every affiliate to maximize the worldwide 
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where 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are given by 
[1] 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
= �−[1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖] − [1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖] ∙ 𝛾𝛾 ∙
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
� − 𝜆𝜆 = 0  ∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. [8] 









From [8] and [9] we can derive the amount of profits shifted in or out of affiliate 𝑖𝑖.16 
[1] 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝛾𝛾 ∙ [1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]
∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 [10] 
where  ∆𝑡𝑡 ≡ �∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘[1+𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘]











𝛾𝛾 ∙ [1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]
> 0. [11] 
Hence, if the tax rate in a country is relatively low, then multinationals most likely shift profits into 
that country. 17 If the tax in a country is relatively high, then it is likely that multinationals shift 
profits abroad. This result is a common result in the previous theoretical and empirical literature 
on profit shifting (e.g. Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008) or Fuest, Hebous, and 
Riedel (2011)). This result remains unchanged by accounting for corruption in the tax 
administation.  
The question we are interested in is how corruption in the tax administration in the country where 
the affiliate is located influences profit-shifting behavior of that firm. Making use of [10], we obtain 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. Increasing control of corruption in the tax administration of a country where an 
affiliate is located decreases profits shifted.  
Proof: To see this we can derive from [10] the effect of an increase in the control of corruption 


























   
 
16 For a detailed derivation, see the Online Appendix C. 
17 When we compare our model with one that does not account for corruption (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 0), the marginal subsidiary for 
which the multinational is indifferent between shifting profits in or out may differ. This is the case because the firm 
faces a weighted tax differential. Hence, it may be that a multinational shifts profits into a subsidiary with a marginally 
higher tax rate than the average one, because the higher level of control of corruption in that country makes it more 
lucrative to keep profits there.  
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From Proposition 1 it follows that a country with low control of corruption in the tax administration 
faces more profit shifting than a country with high control of corruption in the tax administration, 
when both have the same tax on profits. This is the case because the costs of profit shifting decrease 
with corruption. As a result, countries that, on average, receive profits from abroad may have no 
incentive to decrease the corruption in the tax administration. This is because as corrupt officials 
help reduce the transfer costs of profits, corruption may increase profit inflows and tax revenues. 
On the other hand, countries that, on average, lose profits because of profit shifting, may have a 
strong incentive to decrease this type of corruption. This may lead to a tax-enforcement competition 
between countries that should be addressed in future research.18 
2.3. EXTENDING THE SIMPLE THEORY  
The simple theory presented in this paper could be extended in several ways. In this section we 
discuss the modelling simplifications that make the model more tractable and the justifications for 
making those assumptions. 
First, we do not account for the fixed costs of profit shifting. The model is set up in a way that 
firms can alter their profit transfers continuously when the tax rates change. This allows us to link 
the theoretical model to a dynamic setup in the data in which tax rates change over time. However, 
there is new, and emerging, literature arguing that firms may be facing fixed costs of profit shifting 
(Koethenbuerger et al. (2019), Bilicka et al. (2019)). Including fixed costs in our model does not 
alter the main mechanism. Corrupt officials and firms will still have an incentive to agree to 
collude, as long as there is a bribe that is smaller than the total costs of an audit. The size of shifted 
profits will be determined by the likelihood of meeting a corrupt official and the tax rate 
differential. The only difference is that in some instances, firms that would have transferred profits 
without the presence of fixed costs, may not do so now, if they think they are not likely to encounter 
a corrupt tax official. Consequently, the model would not predict a continuous effect of changes in 
tax rates and corruption on the amount of shifted profits. However, this will not affect the direction 
of the effects nor the mechanism presented in our theoretical section.  
Second, we assume that profit shifting costs are equally borne both in the country that receives the 
shifted profits and the country than sends the shifted profits. This is in line with the findings of 
Becker and Davis (2014) who study how transfer prices are set. They conduct a series of interviews 
 
18 For a summary of the discussion on merits of tax competition, see Konrad and Stolper (2016). 
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with tax authorities from high and low tax countries, employees at major accounting firms, and 
multinational firm managers. Relevant for our model are two of their findings. First, typically 
transfer prices are the outcome of negotiations between tax officials from both countries. Second, 
firms participate in this process by suggesting the ‘right’ transfer price in the country that is about 
to lose tax revenue and later by providing advice and legal support to the tax authorities in the 
country that receives those profits. Hence, there are costs to profit shifting on both ends of the 
transfer. For simplicity we do not model the negotiation between the tax authorities and assume 
that the transfer of profits in both directions is costly.19  
Third, we do not distinguish between corruption in the country of origin and destination because 
the reasons for a bribe are the same in both cases. Firms pay bribes to reduce bureaucracy costs 
(red tape) associated with the paperwork linked to the legal processes of tax avoidance. Typically, 
both tax administrations are involved in the processes that leads to, for instance, setting a transfer 
price. During this process one tax administration is working to keep the profits in the country and 
the other to get them in. Bribes in both countries can help firms reduce the time and effort they 
must invest until both tax administrations come to an agreement.  
We do not include a more elaborate model that accounts for those extensions for two reasons. First, 
we do not have the possibility to test specifics of such a model empirically. Second, this will not 
affect the direction of the effects nor the mechanism presented in our theoretical section. 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION APPROACH 
3.1. ESTIMATION APPROACH 
Using a panel of firm-level data on European companies, we aim to quantify the joint effect of 
taxation and corruption on profit shifting, i.e., we test Proposition 1. The challenge, however, is 
that profit shifting itself is typically20 not observable. We can only observe the reported profit of 
firms and therefore only indirectly test Proposition 1. Using [10] we can derive the expected 
reported profit of a multinational firm. 
 
19 The model developed in this paper extends the basic idea that profit shifting cots occur on both ends of the transfer 
by accounting for corruption in tax administrations. However, this model is by far less sophisticated than the model of 
Becker and Davies. 
20 Most studies use, as we do, accounting data, hence, they only indirectly study profit shifting. One of the few 
noteworthy exceptions are the recent studies by Bilicka (2019) and by Davies et. al. (2018) that utilize confidential 
corporate tax returns datasets to measure the extent of profit shifting directly. 
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[1] 𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 �1 −
∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝛾𝛾 ∙ [1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]
� [12] 
After taking the logs, we can approximate this to obtain 
[1] log(𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 −
1
𝛾𝛾
∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖� ≈ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) −
1
𝛾𝛾






The variable 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a composite tax and corruption variable that reflects how tax and corruption 
drive profit shifting. It is a corruption adjusted tax differential. The true profit of a firm 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖  as well 
as the corruption adjusted tax differential 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 cannot directly be observed given the data 
available. Hence, we need to find proxies for both determinants of the reported profits.   
Approximating the CTC Parameter  
To calculate the composite tax and corruption parameter (CTC) for all affiliates of a multinational 
firm we have to make some simplifications, mainly because of data availability. For this, we will 
use the well-known results from the previous empirical literature that are not accounted for by our 
theoretical analysis.  
First, we do not know the true profit of all affiliates of a multinational company21. Therefore, we 
cannot, as the theory suggests, calculate size- or sales- weighted multinational average tax rates. 
This is a common problem in the empirical literature that focuses on the extent of profit shifting of 
European firms. 22  Hence, following Dischinger and Riedel, (2011) we make a simplifying 
assumption that each subsidiary has equal weight, so that ∆𝑡𝑡 becomes 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 −
1
𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖 . 
Second, the profit shifting literature often makes a case that it becomes more difficult to shift profits 
to affiliates further away in the company ownership tree. This may, for example, arise because 
firms that are direct subsidiaries have trade relationships in the form of exchange of upstream 
 
21 This is the case since we only have firm level data for European firms. We know that this particular firm has affiliates 
in other countries, but we do not have detailed accounting information for many of those affiliates. 
22 See for example Huizinga and Laeven, (2008); Dischinger and Riedel, (2011); Dharmapala and Riedel, (2013) or 
Beer and Loeprick (2015). Similar to Huizinga and Laeven (2008) we could construct a sales-weighted or size-
weighted corruption adjusted tax rate differential for a subsample of companies for which we have information on 
sales or assets of majority of their subsdiaries. This substantially limits our sample. However, similarly to Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011) when doing this, we find that the application of weighted differentials leads to qualitatively 
comparable results. These are available from the authors upon request. 
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products. In such cases profit shifting could occur by manipulating transfer prices of these existing 
transactions, which may decrease the cost of shifting profits.23 Hence, firms may be more willing 
to shift profits to either parent company or closest subsidiary. In the empirical section we use this 
information to construct three different definitions of what constitutes a group of related affiliates. 
Subgroup A contains all firms that belong directly to the same Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) and 
the GUO itself; subgroup B contains all subsidiaries of the firm and its GUO and subgroup C 
contains all firms that have the same GUO as the observed firm. Figure 4 in the Appendix illustrates 
the definitions of the three subgroups. 
Third, and related, previous literature suggests that multinational firms cannot or do not want to 
shift profits between all their affiliates. For example, there is evidence that multinationals tend to 
accumulate profits in their headquarters (Dischinger, Knoll, & Riedel, 2014) that cannot be 
explained by tax differences alone. On the other hand, if a multinational has an affiliate in a tax 
haven country, profits may always be shifted directly to the tax haven (Dowd, Landefeld, & Moore, 
2017), subject to Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules.24 This would mean that the tax rates 
of other affiliates of that multinational are not relevant.25  
Given these considerations we use three different measures to approximate for ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 .26 First, we 
define ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚 ≡ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚, where 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is the un-weighted average of the tax rate of all affiliates 
belonging to subgroups 𝑚𝑚. Here subgroup m takes values A, B or C as defined above. Second, 
using the idea that “there is no such place as home”, we define ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≡ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 where 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is the 
tax rate at the multinational firms headquarter (HQ). Third, given a large discussion in the literature 
on the existence and use of tax havens we define ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 that is 1 when a tax haven is part of the 
multinational firm structure and is otherwise 0. We define tax haven, following Hines and Rice 
(1994) as a country on the OECD tax haven list.27 
 
23 Davies et.al. (2018) for example, shows that the bulk of tax loss from transfer prices manipulation in France is 
coming from the actions of a few closely linked multinational firms.  
24 The CFC rules are anti-avoidance provisions designed to prevent diversion of profits to low tax territories. For 
instance, if the UK profits are diverted to a CFC, those profits are apportioned and charged to a UK corporate interest-
holder that holds at least a 25% interest in the CFC. 
25 For a detailed discussion on the use of tax haven affiliates, see for example Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) or more 
recently Gumpert, Hines and Schnitzer (2016). 
26Tax rates data are taken from the CBT Tax Database. 
27 For the list of tax havens used in this paper see Table 7 in the Appendix. 
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Making use of these different definitions of ∆𝑡𝑡 and [14] we obtain five different approximations 
for the CTC index, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝑁𝑁,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁. For those CTC parameters, 
which vary at the firm level, corruption is always measured on the country level. Table 5 in the 
Appendix shows descriptive statistics related to the tax difference parameters. 
Approximating the Profitability of a Firm  
Following Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008), we assume that true profit is 
the return on capital. Capital 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  and labour 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  are jointly employed by the firm to produce 
output 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖. Output generated can be approximated by a Cobb–Douglas production function given 
by 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖
𝜑𝜑 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  where the variable 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is a productivity parameter and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  is a random 
term. The profit generated by the firm is defined as output minus the wages paid, hence 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 −
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖. We assume that the wage 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is equal to the marginal product of labour that is 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∙
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼−1 ∙ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖
𝜑𝜑 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 . Therefore the generated profit can be approximated by  
[1] 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = [1 − 𝛼𝛼] ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖
𝜑𝜑 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 . [15] 
Making use of this and taking the logs of [15], we get 
[1] 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = log(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + log(𝐴𝐴) + 𝛼𝛼 ∙ log(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) + 𝜑𝜑 ∙ log(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 . [16] 
Substituting in [13] 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) we get the following equation that we will be estimating 
[1] log(𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ log(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ log(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ log(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. [17] 
where 𝛽𝛽1 = log(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ,𝛽𝛽3 = 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽4 = 𝜑𝜑 and 𝛽𝛽5 = −
1
𝛾𝛾
 . From, Proposition 1 and [10] we expect 
𝛽𝛽5 to be significant and negative.  
We estimate this equation using OLS and we include fixed assets and employment as time variant 
firm level controls for production function inputs, where the proxy for capital is log of fixed assets 
and the proxy for labor inputs is log of the number of employees28. We further include time variant 
macro variable characteristics, such as GDP per capita and development level of a country. This 
enables us to tease out the effects of tax and corruption rather than specific time varying country 
characteristics. Furthermore, the development level of a country might also influence firm-level 
productivity.  
 
28 Alternative robustness specifications include logs of wages instead (results available upon request from authors). 
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Finally, in order to account for unobserved time and firm level heterogeneities we include year and 
firm fixed effects in the estimated equation. Tax differences to headquarters and to average tax 
within the multinational group vary within firms and between years. This is the variation we 
explore to identify the effects of the CTC parameter on firm’s profits.29 Only for the estimations 
with ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 we forgo using firm fixed effects and use country fixed effects instead. This is 
because the tax haven dummy is constant over time within each firm due to the cross-sectional 
nature of the ownership database. Therefore, in those regressions the identification comes from 
changes in the CTC parameter within countries and over time. 
3.2. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Accounting data  
To test the theoretical predictions of the model we use the firm level accounting data from the 
AMADEUS database provided by Bureau van Dijk.30 The dataset includes unconsolidated and 
consolidated balance sheets and income statements of European companies in the years 2005 – 
2013. We use this data to obtain the firm level reported profits as the main variable of interest in 
our empirical analysis. Specifically, we use unconsolidated firm level data on profit and loss before 
tax. We also use fixed assets and employment data as proxies for capital and labour inputs. 
Since we consider companies with the ability to shift profits abroad, we limit our sample only to 
multinational companies, i.e. those firms that have affiliates abroad. Amadeus data provides us 
with information on ownership structure of companies, which enables us to identify multinational 
and domestic companies. We define a multinational as a company that has a foreign global ultimate 
owner or one of its subsidiaries (up to level 10) is located abroad. We also supplement that with 
the information on whether the global ultimate owner of that company has any foreign subsidiaries 
even if the company itself might not. To identify multinational companies from the domestic 
companies, we use ownership information where the affiliate is owned or owns more than 50% of 
the company.31 Importantly, even though our data only has detailed accounting information for the 
European multinational affiliates, we have ownership information on subsidiaries and headquarters 
 
29 Since our identification comes from differences in tax rates over time our results are not directly comparable to 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), who use a cross sectional variation in weighted tax rate differentials to show the effects 
of those on profit shifting. Our results are more comparable to work of Dischinger and Riedel (2011) who use a similar 
firm-fixed effects specification. In their estimations, the unweighted average tax rate differential affects the ratio of 
intangible profits to sales negatively, which is what we find as well for profits. The magnitude of the effect is 
comparable as well; for the results see Table 1, column 1. 
30 Table 3 in the Appendix presents detailed information on all data sources used. 
31 We experiment with 90% and wholly owned thresholds as well, but they do not change the main results of the paper. 
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located anywhere in the world. The ownership information is time invariant and most of it refers 
to ownership status as of 2013, i.e. it comes from the most recent version of the AMADEUS dataset 
we have. We assume that if the company has foreign affiliates now, it had them before as well, 
which is a limitation of our data. This means that we are unable to identify changes in ownership 
patterns over time. 
The whole Amadeus dataset contains information on 29 million firms over the sample period. Out 
of those 29 million firms, we have unconsolidated firm level information on 400,000 multinational 
affiliates for which we remove missing observations for all the variables of interest. Furthermore, 
we remove top and bottom 1% of the sample distribution to control for the presence of outliers. 
Implicitly, we will exclude affiliates that have negative profit and loss before tax, fixed assets or 
cost of employees, since we run all the regressions in natural logarithms32. After cleaning, the 
dataset has 757,127 observations that describe 190,070 firms. Table 4 in the Appendix summarizes 
the main variables of interest. 
Corruption indicators 
Measuring corruption is inherently difficult, because corruption captures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain and that is unobservable. In this paper, we use two different 
types of corruption indicators to approximate for the effects of corruption on profit shifting. In the 
baseline estimation we use the well-established world governance indicator (WGI) provided by the 
World Bank. In the robustness analysis, we use the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). We 
discuss each in turn.  
WGI is a summary measure of control of corruption based on several different sub-indicators. 
These sub-indicators refer to perceptions of corruption by various groups of respondents, such as 
individuals, firms, nongovernmental agencies, commercial business information providers and 
public-sector organizations.33 The WGI control of corruption index captures all years and countries 
in our firm level data sample. Relative to the other widely used perception of corruption indicator, 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), WGI has two main advantages. 
First, it improves the CPI methodology, as it draws on substantially more data sources and is 
 
32 In the light of recently emerging evidence on the importance of reporting zero profits for the extent of multinational 
profit shifting (see Bilicka, 2019), we will show that our results are robust to the inclusion of negative profits. 
33 The underlining definition of corruption that is used to select the different sub-indicators is: Control of Corruption, 
measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005, p. 5). 
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therefore less likely to be biased by the perception of a handful of experts (for more details see 
Kaufmann et al. 2005).34 Second, the WGI includes other indicators of governance quality that we 
can use to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by overall institutional differences 
rather than corruption in particular (Johannesen, Tørsløv, & Wier, 2017). However, the limitation 
of this indicator is that the propensity to collect taxes is only one of the dimensions of corruption 
captured by the WGI index. The index also captures several other forms of corruption. When using 
the WB index, we therefore implicitly assume that corruption is a systematic phenomenon. Hence, 
if there is a change in one type of corruption, there is usually also a change in the other.  
In the cross-section the WGI measure of control of corruption is strongly correlated with other 
government quality indicators (0.75 - 0.9 correlations are typical). However, comparing the 
development of the governance indicators over time reveals that their movements over time are not 
highly correlated. The correlation between changes over time in control of corruption and changes 
over time in other governance indicators varies from 0.08 for political stability to 0.358 for 
government effectiveness. Further, the standard deviation in the control of corruption measure over 
time displays low correlations with Regulatory Quality (0.33), Government Effectiveness (0.46), 
Voice and Accountability (-0.07) and Political Stability (0.30). This suggests that our results are 
likely to be related to changes in the control of corruption and not to changes in other governance 
indicators.35 
The second measure of control of corruption we use, WBES, is an indicator that comes from the 
World Bank survey of firms that has been run since 2005. The question we use as an indicator for 
corruption in the tax administration is “percent of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax 
officials”. This means that the results using WB survey indicator as a proxy for corruption can be 
more directly attributed to control of corruption in the tax administration, rather than corruption 
outside of tax administration or general quality of the government institutions. However, the 
disadvantage of using the WB Survey Indicators is that our sample decreases considerably; the 
indicator is not available for all the countries in our sample and the survey has not been conducted 
 
34 We have run the main specifications with the CPI indicators and the qualitative results remain unchanged, but the 
point estimates vary slightly, mostly due to a slightly different sample composition. 
35 In the Online Appendix B.2, we test the validity of these claims by including in the baseline model interactions with 
various governance indicators in addition to interactions with control of corruption. In majority of the specifications, 
the control of corruption interaction with tax rate differential is significant, while the other governance indicator 
interaction is not. This suggests that out main results are driven by changes in control of corruption rather than overall 
changes in governance quality.  
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yearly, hence, we do not have a full balanced panel for the indicator.36. In the years when the WB 
Survey has been conducted the correlation between the two corruption indicators, we use is very 
high and ranges between 0.7 and 0.93 suggesting that these two measures are strongly related to 
each other.  
3.3. IDENTIFYING VARIATION  
Using CTC allows us to account for the joint effect of the tax rate differential and the level of 
corruption on profit shifting. Since our main specification is a firm fixed effects regression, we rely 
on the variation in both tax rate differentials and corruption levels over time to identify the effects 
of the CTC parameter on profit shifting. In this section we discuss how CTC and each of the 
components of the CTC parameter evolve over time.  
Corruption is often described to be very persistent over time, which is why there is a debate about 
the capability of the existing corruption indicators to capture changes in corruption over short time 
periods. To show that this is not the case during the analyzed sample period, Figure 1 (left) shows 
the control of corruption as reported by the WGI in 2013 on the horizontal axis with the control of 
corruption reported in 2005 on the vertical axis. We can clearly see that control of corruption has 
changed in most of the countries over the analyzed time period and that the direction of the change 
is either for the worse or the better. The further away from the 45-degree line the country is, the 
larger the change in corruption; countries such as Lithuania or Macedonia have recorded the largest 
increases in control of corruption between 2005 and 2013, while Greece and Slovakia have 
recorded largest decreases in control of corruption. 
 
36 For the list of countries and mean values of corruption indicators see Table 7 in the Appendix.  
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Figure 1 Change of Control of Corruption (WGI) over time 
When we consider yearly changes in control of corruption for selected group of countries (Figure 
1, right) we can identify several large changes in the control of corruption within these countries 
between years e.g. Ukraine from 2008 to 2009, Spain from 2012 to 2013, Poland from 2007 to 
2008 or Austria from 2007 to 2012. We also see that in some countries the change in corruption is 
never meaningful; e.g. Germany.37  
The second source of variation in the CTC parameter comes from changes in tax rate differentials 
over time. Note that these changes occur at the firm level. Figure 2 illustrates for some selected 
affiliates of multinational companies located in different countries, the evolution over time of the 
tax rate differentials to their headquarters ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 (left) and tax rate differentials to the average among 
the other affiliates  ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 (right). Like the corruption indicator, tax rate differentials are in some 
instances also fairly persistent. For example, for the subsidiaries located in Italy, the tax rate 
differences to their headquarter have remained virtually unchanged over the time period. On the 
other hand, for the subsidiaries located in Spain, Poland, Lithuania or Ukraine the tax rate 
differences to their headquarters have changed substantially over the sample period (Figure 2, left). 
As expected, the changes in the tax rate differentials over time are more pronounced when we 
 
37 Note that the changes in corruption are often correlated with the reforms effort. For instance, upon EU accession 
Poland has reformed its Anti-Corruption Policy, which is visible in the increasing control of corruption index from 
2004 onwards. Further, Austria has introduced a package of anti-corruption reforms in 2012 in response to the falling 
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consider the differences between the domestic tax rate and the un-weighted average of all the tax 
rates faced by the other affiliates of the multinational firm (Figure 2, right). Here, we can see yearly 
tax differential changes for affiliates in all countries. The comparison between the two panels in 
Figure 2 also highlights the importance of using various definitions of tax rate differentials. For 
instance, the affiliate located in Spain has on average faced a decrease in the gap between its tax 
rate and the tax rate of its headquarter, while the tax rate gap relative to the average of all the 
subsidiaries of the multinational company was more stable (apart from 2013).   
Taken together Figures 1 and 2 show, that there exists a substantial variation in both corruption 
levels and tax rate differentials to identify the effects of the CTC parameter on profit shifting. It is 
important to note that tax rate changes on the country level as well as tax rate differential changes 
over time are not correlated with corruption changes. The correlation between statutory tax rate 
changes and control of corruption changes in countries where affiliates are located is almost zero 
(-0.007), similar to the correlation between changes in the tax rate differentials and changes in 
control of corruption (-0.02 for changes to the average tax rate differentials and -0.006 for changes 
to the headquarter tax rate differential). This makes us confident that the changes in the CTC 
parameter are driven by both corruption and tax rate differential changes, rather than strictly by tax 
rate differentials, as has been shown by the previous literature. 
      



















































4.1. REPORTED PROFITS  
Table 1 shows the baseline results using equation [17] and various definitions of the CTC parameter 
as outlined in Section 3.1. First, in column 1 we present results with the tax rate differential which 
is not adjusted for corruption. We use the average tax rate that includes all affiliates linked to the 
multinational headquarter (definition C). This is how the previous literature on profit shifting 
estimated the responses of reported profits to changes in the tax rate differential. We find the 
coefficient on the tax rate differential to be 0.52. Heckmeyer and Overesch (2017) show in their 
meta-study that the estimate of this semi-elasticity is 0.8 on average. One of the most influential 
early studies by Huizinga and Leaven (2008) using European multinationals and a cross sectional 
variation in tax rate differential finds the semi-elasticity to be 1.3. Generally, estimates using panel 
data and affiliate fixed effects are considerably smaller than those found by Huizinga and 
Leaven  (2008) (see discussion by Dharmapala (2014)). For instance, Dischinger et al. (2014) show 
that the average semi-elasticity of profits in Amadeus data is 0.7, while Lohse and Riedel (2013) 
use more recent data to show that this semi-elasticity is 0.4. Considering that we use Amadeus data 
in our study, our coefficients are comparable to the latter two studies and their magnitudes are in 
line with what the previous literature has shown. 
In columns 2 – 6 we investigate the effects of the theoretically derived corruption adjusted tax rate 
differential on the reported profits of multinational companies. Column 2 uses the average tax rate 
that includes all affiliates linked to the multinational headquarter (definition C), columns 3 looks 
at the average tax rate defined by the HQ and all of subsidiaries of the observed firm (definition 
B), while column 4 looks at the average tax rate of all firms with direct link to the HQ (definition 
A). Column 5 uses the difference in the tax rate of the firm to its HQ and column 6 uses the tax 
haven dummy as a measure of the extent of profit shifting incentives. From the theory we expect 
the CTC parameter to be significant and negative and that is the case throughout the estimations, 
irrespective of what definition of the tax difference we use to construct the parameter.  
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TABLE 1 THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION AND TAXATION ON REPORTED PROFITS.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Definitions of CTC 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑁𝑁  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁  
       
capital 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.199*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
labour 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.430*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
ln(GDPpc) 1.157*** 1.177*** 1.185*** 1.177*** 1.184*** 1.184*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
∆𝑡𝑡  -0.520***      
 (0.120)      
CTC  -0.972*** -1.649*** -0.986*** -0.981*** -0.129*** 
  (0.191) (0.246) (0.180) (0.135) (0.015) 
Constant -8.468*** -8.676*** -8.765*** -8.681*** -8.752*** -9.491*** 
 (0.531) (0.538) (0.538) (0.538) (0.538) (0.533) 
       
#Obs. 613,593 605,399 605,399 605,399 605,543 716,539 
#Firms 153,780 152,997 152,997 152,997 153,050 181,359 
R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.506 
Note: Dependent variable: ln(pbt), Standard errors are clustered at the corporate group and country level, (***) p<0.01, 
(**) p<0.05, (*) p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) use ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 , column (3) uses ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑁𝑁 , column (4) ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴, column (5) ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
and column (6) 𝑑𝑑∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 as a proxy for tax rate difference in the calculation of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. All estimates include firm and 
year fixed effects except column (6) that uses country and year fixed effects. 
These results are consistent with Proposition 1 under the assumption the corruption index used here 
is a good proxy for corruption in tax administration. We show that increasing CTC decreases profits 
reported by an affiliate. The coefficient estimates for CTC are quite stable when comparing the 
results with firm fixed effects in columns 2 – 5. 
To interpret these coefficients, let us consider the result from Column 2. Here, an increase in the 
CTC parameter by one unit leads to a decrease in the firm’s reported profit by approximately 97%. 
Considering that the standard deviation in the CTC parameter is 0.027 (see Table 5 in the 
Appendix), this implies that a standard deviation change in the CTC parameter leads to a 2.6% 
decrease in the firm’s reported profit. This implies a large and highly significant joint effect of 
taxes and corruption on reported profits. 
Further, the theory model tells us that ?̂?𝛽5 should proxy for −1/𝛾𝛾 . Hence, using the estimated 
coefficient on ?̂?𝛽5 and the range of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 we can calculate the implied maximum and minimum 
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size of the CTC effect (that is identical to the share of true profits shifted) on the profits reported 
by a firm in our sample. Using [12] and ?̂?𝛽5 = −0.972 implies that the effect of CTC parameter on 
profits varies between -19% and 16%.38  
Table 2 addresses several concerns related to the baseline results. Column 1 uses a different 
measure of corruption, column 2 considers the case of negative profits, column 3 uses a firm 
specific measure of corruption to adjust the tax rate differential in the CTC parameter, while 
columns 4 - 6 analyze to what extent the effect of the CTC parameter on reported profits is driven 
by both tax and corruption.  
The results from Column 1 are directly comparable to those from Column 2 in Table 1 as we use 
the same measure of tax differential here. The only difference is that we now use the WB Survey 
indicator to approximate for corruption. Despite the substantial decrease in the samples size, our 
main result remains significant. The CTC parameter negatively and significantly affects the 
reported profits of firms. The magnitude of the effect is larger, and in this smaller sample, one 
standard deviation increase in the CTC parameter (0.0223 see Table 5 in the Appendix) results in 
7.1% decrease in the reported profits. 
In column 2 we explore whether adding back negative profits would have any effect on the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients. To do so, we define a new dependent variable that takes 
value zero for all observations with zero or negative profit and loss before taxes and takes value 
log(𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) otherwise. In Column 2 we estimate a model with this new variable, which is censored 
at zero using panel data Tobit specification. We find that the coefficient on the CTC parameter is 
smaller in this specification, but not significantly so. This reassures us that the results are not driven 
only by the positive profits part of the profits distribution.  
In column 3 we explore the possibility of making corruption a firm specific variable. To do this we 
use the average corruption rate amongst companies belonging to the same GUO and the GUO 
corruption rate itself and use that in the definition of the CTC parameter itself. Hence, instead of 
adjusting tax rate differential by the corruption in the country where the profits are reported, now 
the tax rate differential is adjusted by the average of all corruption rates in all countries of 
subsidiaries belonging to the same parent company and the corruption in the country of the parent 
 
38 We know that the share of profits shifted should be ?̂?𝛽5 ∙ CTC. Hence 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 = .162 implies a 15.7% profits inflow 
and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 = −.191 a 18.6% profits outflow. 
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company. Therefore, corruption is a firm specific variable in those specifications. This increases 
the size of the coefficient on the CTC parameter slightly, from -0.92 to -0.99, but this change is not 
statistically significant.  
The results from columns 4 – 7 show that the results using the CTC parameter are driven jointly 
by corruption and tax rate differentials. Further, they also address Proposition 1 directly, by 
showing how corruption affects the relationship between tax rate differentials and reported profits. 
Here, we use an alternative estimation approach, in which, instead of using the CTC parameter as 
one of the regressors, we use logarithm of control of corruption and tax rate differentials separately 
and include an interaction effect between the two.39 Hence, we estimate the following 
[1] log(𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ log(𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ log(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ log(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. 
[18] 
The findings presented in columns 4 – 7 in are in line with what our theory model predicts. The 
larger the difference between tax rates in the country where the firm is located and the tax rates 
abroad, the lower the profits reported by that particular firm. Further, the interaction between tax 
and corruption is also statistically significant and suggests that corruption has an effect on how tax 
rate differentials between firms affect reported profits. The more corrupt the country is, the larger 
the effect the tax differential has on reported profits. In other words, corruption amplifies profit-
shifting incentives, as predicted by Proposition 1.  
However, we should interpret these results with caution. This is because the theoretical model 
implies a non-linear joint effect of corruption and taxation on profit shifting. Therefore, separately 
estimating the effects of corruption and tax rate differentials may mean that the model may be miss-
specified.40  
 
39 Online Appendix B.1. presents the theoretical underpinning for the alternative estimation equation. 
40 We discus additional findings in the Online Appendix. Appendix A talks about the role of intangible assets. 
Appendix B discuses additional factors that might influence our main results, like the corruption outside the tax 




TABLE 2 ROBUSTNESS  
Definitions of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CTC 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 
        
capital 0.134*** -0.065*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.198*** 0.134*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
labour 0.354*** 0.667*** 0.316*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.430*** 0.351*** 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.018) 
log(GDPpc) 1.331*** 0.049*** 1.234*** 1.151*** 1.143*** 1.087*** 1.211*** 
 (0.189) (0.008) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.192) 
CTC -3.205*** -0.815*** -0.985***     
 (0.755) (0.248) (0.252)     
∆𝑡𝑡     -2.188*** -1.229*** -0.213*** -3.798*** 
    (0.339) (0.203) (0.023) (0.870) 
control of Corr.    0.159** 0.180*** 0.397*** 0.408*** 
    (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.125) 
∆𝑡𝑡 ×control     2.800*** 1.066*** 0.288*** 2.812*** 
   of Corr.    (0.521) (0.330) (0.039) (0.910) 
Constant -11.53*** 0.558*** -9.177*** -8.504*** -8.421*** -8.795*** -10.503*** 
 (2.024) (0.084) (0.604) (0.565) (0.563) (0.548) (2.045) 
#Observations 66,354 919,766 505,522 605,399 605,543 716,539 66,354 
#Firms 44,554 187,446 136,293 152,997 153,050 181,359 44,554 
R-squared 0.091  0.032 0.035 0.035 0.506 0.091 
Note: Dependent variable: ln(pbt). Standard errors are clustered at the corporate group and country level, (***) p<0.01, 
(**) p<0.05, (*) p<0.1. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7) use ∆𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 , column (5) ∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 and column (6) 𝑑𝑑∆𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 as a 
proxy for tax rate difference. Columns (1) and (7) use the WB business survey measure of corruption in the tax 
administration while the others use the WGI corruption indicator. In column (2) the missing values of ln(pbt are 
replaced by zeros if pbt was negative or zero. In column (3) CTC is weighted by the average corruption across all firm 
subsidiary locations. Columns (4) and (7) proxy the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 by an interaction term between the tax rate difference and 
the level of domestic control of corruption, hence they estimate [18] instead of [17]. All estimates include firm and 
year fixed effects except column (6) that uses country and year fixed effects.  
4.2. IMPLIED DOMESTIC TAX REVENUE ELASTICITIES 
In this section we use the estimated coefficients on the CTC parameter to calculate tax revenue 
elasticities with respect to the top statutory tax rates for each country in the sample. Using the 
estimate of the effect of CTC on reported profits from Column 2 in Table 1 we can calculate 𝛾𝛾 =
1 [−0.972]⁄ = 1.03. This, together with the firm level data for European firms, allows us to 
simulate the elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate for different 





�1 − ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 ∙ [1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖]
�
. [19] 
Then we calculate the profit that would be reported in country 𝑗𝑗 by firm 𝑖𝑖, if the statutory tax rate 
increases by one percentage point. From [12] we obtain  
[1] 
𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+0,01 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 �1 −
∆𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 0.01
𝛾𝛾 ∙ �1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗�
�. [20] 
From this, we can calculate the sum of the changes in reported profit for all firms 𝑖𝑖 that are located 
in country 𝑗𝑗 as follows  
[1] 




where 𝑙𝑙 is the number of firms belonging to country 𝑗𝑗. Using this, we calculate the tax revenue 





+ 1. [22] 
The tax revenue elasticity tells us the percentage change in tax collected from all firms in country 𝑗𝑗, 
given a one percent change in the tax rate of country 𝑗𝑗. Hence, the tax revenue elasticities represent 
revenue gains in response to changes in statutory tax rates. Obtaining correct estimates of tax 
revenue elasticities is important, especially in the light of the financial crisis recovery and proposals 
by some countries to raise their tax revenues by increasing their tax rates. Specifically, Greece has 
suggested that an increase in their statutory tax rate would raise required revenues.  
We calculate the tax revenue elasticities for the year 2013 for all European countries in our 
sample.41 The results are presented in Figure 3, where each dot represents a country. On the vertical 
axis we have tax revenue elasticities and on the horizontal axis we have control of corruption. 
Therefore, the plot shows how tax revenue elasticities change with an increase in control of 
corruption. The plotted elasticities are grouped into three different clusters, according to their 
statutory tax rates; triangles represent countries with low statutory tax rates (0.05-0.15), circles 
 
41 The underlying data for Figure 3 is summarized in Table 6 in the Appendix. 
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represent countries with medium statutory tax rates (0.15-0.25) and squares represent countries 
with high statutory tax (0.25-0.35).42 
All countries have absolute elasticities below 1, but larger than zero. Hence, no country has a tax 
rate that is Laffer inefficient. Within each group of tax rates, the tax revenue elasticities are an 
increasing function of control of corruption. This means that countries with otherwise similar tax 
rates face lower tax revenue elasticities when they are more corrupt. Thus, corruption decreases the 
possible gains that countries could have from tax rate increases. For instance, a tax rate increase of 
1% in Portugal increases tax revenue by 0.84%, while a tax rate increase of 1% in Netherlands 
increases tax revenue by 0.86%. This means that Portugal may lose up to approximately 2% of 
their tax revenue due to corruption. This effect is even starker when we compare Italy and Norway. 
A similar 1% increase in tax rate will increase tax revenues by 0.79 percent in Italy and by 0.86 
percent in Norway.43 In other words, a decrease of the level of corruption to the level of Norway 
might induce a tax revenue gain of over 7% in Italy, absent behavioral effects.  
The calculated tax revenue elasticities imply that countries such as Greece and Italy would face the 
largest difficulties in raising tax revenue through increasing their tax rates on profits. This is the 
case as both countries already have high tax rates and face high levels of corruption. On the other 
hand, tax rate cuts by these countries would have less of a negative effect on the total revenue 
collected, than in case of countries with lower corruption levels. 
Specifically, in the light of the recently proposed reforms to the statutory tax rate in the UK and 
Italy we will see the UK tax rate decrease from 20% in 2015 to 17% in 2020, whereas the Italian 
tax rate will decrease from 30% in 2015 to 26% in 2020. Using our elasticity estimates, the cut to 
the UK tax rate by 11% will decrease its revenues by 10% while a 15% cut to the tax rate in Italy 
will reduce its tax revenues by 12%.44  
 
42 For a comparison of the corruption adjusted elasticities with non-corruption adjusted ones, which are standard in the 
literature, see Figure 5 in the Appendix. The elasticities estimated in this paper are smaller and have larger variance 
than the previously estimated ones.  
43 A possible concern here may be that this effect could also be the result of differences in the exposure of firms to 
profit shifting opportunities and not differences in the level of corruption. We show this is not the case. In Figure 5 in 
the Appendix we compare tax revenue elasticities that account for corruption, with tax revenue elasticities as calculated 
by the previous literature. The results show that corruption decreases tax revenue elasticities.  
44 The tax revenue elasticities will differ slightly depending on the definition of the CTC parameter used. Figure 6 in 
the Appendix shows the mean, maximum and minimum tax revenue elasticities implied by the estimates from Table 1 




Figure 3 Semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate 
5. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis has revealed that corruption amplifies profit shifting. Multinationals that have an 
incentive to shift profits, will shift more profits with higher corruption in the tax administration. 
Our theoretical model implies that this is because corruption decreases the cost of profit shifting. 
Corrupt tax officials have an incentive to collect bribes for reducing the tax auditing costs of firms.  
Accounting for the effect of corruption on profit shifting of multinational firms reveals a 
substantially larger heterogeneity of tax elasticities even within Europe. Countries with similar tax 
rates face considerably different tax elasticities when the extent of corruption differs between them. 
On average, countries with high levels of corruption face lower tax revenue elasticities with respect 
to tax rates. Therefore, tax rate increases lead to much smaller tax revenue increases in corrupt 
countries. These results imply that a country with a persistent corruption problem might be unable 
to generate large tax revenues by taxing profits of multinational firms.  
These results highlight that when fighting international tax avoidance, we should account for the 
heterogeneity in the quality of enforcement institutions. In particular, an intensified fight against 
corruption in the tax administration should accompany increases in the tax rates. To be more 
 
bound estimate. For instance, tax revenue elasticities can be as low as 0.64 for Italy and 0.76 for Norway. This would 
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specific, first, high tax countries may want to consider offering countries that face high levels of 
corruption something in return when demanding that they harmonize their tax rates and invest in 
the fight against profit sifting, for example, by implementing the BEPS action plan. In comparison 
to countries where there is little corruption accompanying the enforcement of taxation, these 
countries lose much more tax revenue when complying with the international tax regime.  
Second, intensified fight against tax havens may be one of the most important means for developing 
countries that struggle with high levels of corruption in their tax administration to foster growth in 
tax revenues. As our paper shows, a decrease in the international tax sheltering opportunities 
increases revenue collection substantially in those countries. This could potentially free revenues 
that, in turn, can be used to decrease corruption.           
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Figure 4 Definition of different relevant profit shifting groups: A ; B ; C  
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Figure 6 Variation in the implied tax revenue elasticities (Table 1 Colum 2 to 4). 
 
TABLE 3: DATA SOURCES. 
Variable Data source Data link 








Statutory corporate tax rate CBT Tax Database https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/faculty-
research/tax/publications/data 
Profits, capital, labour AMADEUS BvD Data link through Oxford library 
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TABLE 4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
statutory tax rate 757,127 0.247 0.063 0 0.350 
control of corruption 721,320 0.517 0.254 0 1 
corruption in tax admin.  94,285 13.230 15.556 0 67.600 
lnGDPpc 730,154 10.656 1.027 7.216 15.533 
      
lnpbt 757,127 4.956 2.005 0 8.005 
capital 757,127 5.745 2.536 0 18.475 
labor 757,127 2.969 1.589 0 10.942 
      
Note: Source: Firm level data is from BvD AMADEUS, corruption indicators from WB, tax rates from the CBT tax 
database. 
TABLE 5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON TAX DIFFERENTIALS 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  605,549 0.002 0.059 -0.267 0.246 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁 721,320 0,065 0.210 0 1 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝐴𝐴  605,405 0 0.031 -0.191 0.163 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝑁𝑁  605,405 0.002 0.029 -0.135 0.139 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶  605,405 0 0.027 -0.191 0.162 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶 (WB Survey) 66,354 -.007 .023 -0.162 0.128 
      
Note: Source: Tax data from the CBT tax database. 
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AUT 0.250 0.714 0,857 ITA 0.275 0.288 0,791 
BEL 0.330 0.747 0,812 LTU 0.150 0.398 0,899 
BGR 0.100 0.220 0,924 LUX 0.225 0.879 0,885 
BIH 0.100 0.239 0,925 LVA 0.150 0.374 0,897 
CHE 0.085 0.885 0,958 MDA 0.120 0.096 0,894 
CYP 0.125 0.640 0,929 MKD 0.100 0.305 0,929 
CZE 0.190 0.352 0,866 MLT 0.350 0.571 0,774 
DEU 0.150 0.788 0,921 MNE 0.090 0.231 0,929 
DNK 0.250 0.962 0,876 NLD 0.250 0.863 0,869 
ESP 0.300 0.522 0,805 NOR 0.280 0.929 0,857 
EST 0.210 0.604 0,873 POL 0.190 0.451 0,875 
FIN 0.200 0.901 0,899 PRT 0.250 0.552 0,844 
FRA 0.333 0.657 0,800 RUS 0.200 0.027 0,811 
GBR 0.240 0.761 0,868 SRB 0.150 0.225 0,884 
GRC 0.260 0.269 0,799 SVK 0.230 0.316 0,830 
HRV 0.200 0.330 0,855 SVN 0.170 0.492 0,891 
HUN 0.190 0.379 0,869 SWE 0.220 0.929 0,890 
IRL 0.125 0.723 0,933 TUR 0.200 0.330 0,854 
ISL 0.200 0.821 0,894 UKR 0.190 0.000 0,817 
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Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev.       Freq. 
AT  0.77   0.07   24,357     
BA  0.21   0.02   6,799   0.85   0.24   2,114  
BE  0.70   0.03   121,627     
BG  0.24   0.02   17,108   0.89   0.12   7,067  
CH  0.88   0.01   328     
CY  0.59   0.04   166     
CZ  0.38   0.02   80,802   0.92   0.15   24,915  
DE  0.78   0.01   96,185   0.85   -     7,456  
DK  0.97   0.01   49,250     
EE  0.56   0.02   24,814   0.97   0.06   8,087  
ES  0.58   0.03   151,124   0.86   -     13,285  
FI  0.93   0.03   34,856     
FR  0.69   0.02   254,699     
GB  0.76   0.03   300,713     
GR  0.31   0.06   11,815   0.44   -     1,118  
HR  0.30   0.02   248,047   0.93   0.08   71,373  
HU  0.40   0.04   16,411   0.94   0.10   5,670  
IE  0.75   0.03   26,691   0.89   -     1,733  
IS  0.87   0.06   7,057     
IT  0.34   0.05   242,577     
LI  0.72   0.08   24     
LT  0.35   0.03   6,368   0.84   0.13   1,868  
LU  0.86   0.03   16,605     
LV  0.35   0.02   16,763   0.95   0.10   4,939  
MD  0.12   0.01   371   0.76   0.14   124  
ME  0.23   -     6   0.95   0.05   39  
MK  0.27   0.04   192   0.91   0.09   54  
MT  0.55   0.02   4,853     
NL  0.88   0.02   45,814     
NO  0.88   0.04   72,332     
PL  0.41   0.04   74,197   0.92   0.10   21,581  
PT  0.57   0.02   67,166   0.48   -     2,781  
RS  0.22   0.01   18,400   0.83   0.24   6,068  
RU  0.03   0.02   123,449   0.81   0.19   43,317  
SE  0.92   0.02   114,237   1.00   -     3,827  
SI  0.54   0.03   10,484   0.96   0.06   2,887  
SK  0.36   0.03   48,871   0.94   0.09   16,738  
TR  0.32   0.01   1,739   0.97   0.02   463  
UA  0.05   0.04   26,188   0.58   0.10   8,298  
Note: The WBES indicator was transformed to reflect the WGI control of corruption, hence it is 1 minus percent of 
firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax official; e.g. 1.0 for Sweden means zero percent of bribes.  
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TABLE 11 LIST OF TAX HAVENS. 
Andorra 
Anguilla 







Cayman Islands (the) 

























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Martin (French part) 








Turks and Caicos Islands (the) 
Vanuatu 
Virgin Islands (British) 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
 
